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JUST WHO IS THE PERSON HAVING ORDINARY SKILL
IN THE ART? PATENT LAW'S MYSTERIOUS
PERSONAGE
Joseph P. Meara, Ph.D.
Abstract: Various patent validity and infringement questions are decided against the
standard of the "person having ordinary skill in the art" (Phosita). For example, under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a), an invention must be nonobvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to be
granted a patent. In this context, the Federal Circuit has set out six factors for measuring the
level of skill of Phosita, yet the court has provided remarkably little guidance in their use and
their relationship to nonobviousness. This situation has led to confusion and difficulties
among courts trying to assess Phosita's skill. This Comment argues that the current factors
must be abandoned or modified, and suggests new factors which more accurately reflect the
underlying purpose of the Phosita standard.

Patent law's "person having ordinary skill in the art" (Phositat ) has
been likened to the reasonable person of tort law.2 Just as the fact finder
must resolve a negligence claim against the standard of the reasonable
person, so too must one assess various patent validity and infringement
claims in comparison to the person having ordinary skill in the art.3
Inventions that would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the
art are unpatentable. 4 Applications that fail to teach one of ordinary skill
in the art how to make or use the invention are invalid.' Patent claims,
which set forth metes and bounds of the property right, are construed in
light of what the person of ordinary skill would understand them to
describe.6 Thus, in litigation, the scope of patent protection depends
greatly on the court's determination of the level of ordinary skill in the
art for the particular field of invention.
1. Cyril A. Soans first coined the Phosita moniker in Some Absurd Presumptions in Patent Cases,
10 IDEA 433,438 (1966).
2. See, eg., Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(determining that, in the course of the nonobviousness assessment, "the decisionmaker confronts a
ghost, i.e., 'a person having ordinary skill in the art,' not unlike the 'reasonable man' and other
ghosts in the law").
3. See John 0. Tresansky, PHOSITA-The Ubiquitous andEnigmaticPerson in PatentLaw, 73 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 37,37 (1991).
4. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994 & Supp. 1999).
5. See id. § 112,para. 1.
6. See, e-g., Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs, Inc., 806 F.2d 1565, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(holding that claims are invalid for indefiniteness under 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 2, if one skilled in the
art would not understand what is claimed when read in light of the specification).
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Yet, this critical factual inquiry has received comparatively little
attention from the Federal Circuit, the exclusive appellate court for
patent disputes. This Comment examines how the Federal Circuit and
lower courts have defined and assessed the "ordinary level of skill in the
art" in the context of nonobviousness, a fundamental patentability
requirement and the origin of the Phosita standard. Part I gives an
overview of the purpose of patent law and basic patentability
requirements. Part II examines how the level of ordinary skill in the art
affects nonobviousness determinations, and how the lower courts have
used factors set forth by the Federal Circuit to conduct the skill inquiry.
Part III argues that the current factors do not advance the nonobviousness
inquiry and should be discarded or, in some cases, refined. Part IV
proposes new factors for determining the level of ordinary skill in the art
that are more consistent with the intent and purpose of the
nonobviousness inquiry.
I.

OVERVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM

By allowing inventors the opportunity to profit from their inventions,
the patent system spurs innovation, to the benefit of society. A patent
will only be granted on an invention if the application meets minimum
disclosure requirements and if the invention is useful, novel, and
nonobvious.' These requirements ensure that publicly available
knowledge is not removed from the public domain.
A.

The Policy Behind the Patent System

The patent system exists to encourage innovation for the benefit of
society.9 The constitutional provision empowering Congress to create a
patent system reflects this policy by placing general limits on which
inventions may be protected and the scope of the protection.'0 The patent

7. The Federal Circuit, created in 1982, has exclusive appellate jurisdiction for all patent
infringement and validity suits. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L No. 97-164, 96
Stat. 25 (relevant provisions codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); Rochelle
Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1,
3-4 (1989).
8. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-03.
9. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966).
10. Congress has power to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
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statutes implement the constitutional directive by balancing the need to
provide incentive to inventors with the need to encourage competition
through the dissemination and refinement of inventions."1 Upon the grant
of a patent, an inventor may exclude others from making, using, selling,
or importing the inventor's patented invention for a limited time. 2 These
rights give inventors the opportunity to recover research and
development costs and realize profits. 3 In return, the inventor must meet
minimum conditions of patentability and must sufficiently disclose the
invention to permit others to make and use it after it enters the public
domain.' 4 In fact, the information disclosed by the patentee is often used
to build upon or design around the invention long before expiration of
the patent. Thus, market competition is encouraged despite the presence
of patent monopolies.
B.

Obtaining a Patent

To obtain a patent, inventors must submit an application describing
their invention to the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO)
for examination." The application must (1) provide, in the specification,
sufficient written description to assure those skilled in the art that the
inventor truly possesses the invention; 6 (2) disclose sufficient detail to
enable others skilled in the art to make and use the invention; 7 and (3)
clearly set out the metes and bounds of the invention through one or
more claims.'8 In addition to these disclosure requirements, the invention

8; see also Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.,
Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,cl.
489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989).
11. See Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 146. For an in-depth discussion of the economics of patent law,
see JOHN IV. SCHLICHER, PATENT LAW: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRiNCIPLES (1992).
12. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). Utility patents-the primary form of patent protection for functional
products-have terms ending up to twenty years from filing of the application. 35 U.S.C.
§ 154(a)(2).
13. See, eg., John W. Schlicher, Biotechnology and the Patent System; Patent Law and
Proceduresfor Biotechnology,Health Care and OtherIndustries, 4 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. J. 121,
123-24 (1996) (stating that patent right provides an incentive to invent). But see Rebecca S.
Eisenberg, Patentsand the Progressof Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI.
L REv. 1017, 1024-28 (1989) (discussing situations in which the incentive may be unnecessary or
counterproductive).
14. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 150.
15. 35U.S.C. §§ 111, 131.
16. Id. §112,para. 1.
17. Id.
18. See id. § l12,para. 2.
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must fulfill fundamental patentability conditions before a patent will be
granted.' 9
During the examination process, if a PTO examiner finds invalidating
prior art, the application will be rejected. 2' The applicants, through their
attorney, may then argue and/or amend the application to convince the
examiner that the application conforms to statutory requirements. 2' Once
the application meets all the requirements, it is accepted' and a patent is
issued with a presumption of validity.' A challenger in litigation must
prove invalidity by clear and convincing evidence. 4
C.

Conditions of Patentability

Inventors may obtain a patent for "anything under the sun that is made
by man"' if it is useful, novel, and nonobvious. 26 These patentability
conditions prevent inventors from obtaining a monopoly on inventions
already within the public domain. 7 An invention is useful if it provides
some relatively low level of public benefit. For example, both a lifesaving drug and a shirt with a puppet head built into one sleeve 28 meet
the utility standard under the patent statute. However, inventions without
any credible utility are unpatentable 9
An invention is novel if no other pre-existing invention is exactly like
it; i.e., no other pre-existing invention has every claimed element in
exactly the same arrangement. 30 For example, a light bulb with a
molybdenum filament is novel over an otherwise identical light bulb with
19. See infra Part I.C.
20. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.104 (2002). "Prior art" is a term of art referring to any publicly available
reference that predates and is pertinent to the claimed invention. See infra note 60 and accompanying
text.
21. See 37 C.F.R. 1.111-.113.
22. See id. at § 1.104.
23. 35 U.S.C. § 282.
24. See, eg., Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1375 (Fed. Cir.
1986).
25. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (citations omitted).
26. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-03.
27. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989).
28. See, eg., U.S. Patent No. 4,980,929 (issued Jan. 1, 1991) (issuing patent for long-sleeved
garment with integrated animal design and puppet-like sleeve).
29. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 535 (1966) (holding that chemical process to produce
compound of unknown utility is unpatentable).
30. The anticipating invention must be disclosed in a single prior art reference. See Lewmar
Marine, Inc. v. Barient Inc., 827 F.2d 744, 747 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
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a tungsten filament. Even trivial differences will impart novelty to an
invention. An orange plastic trash bag would be novel if all previous
such bags were black, brown, or green.3 Yet, such a novel invention still
might not be patentable if it does not meet the other patentability
conditions.
Utility and novelty alone do not qualify an invention for
patentability;32 the invention must also be nonobvious to a "person
having ordinary skill in the art."" In fact, it would be unconstitutional to
issue a patent for subject matter that could be "readily deduced from
publicly available material."34 In other words, an invention may be novel
if no previous invention contained each of its elements arranged in
exactly the same way. Yet, if it is trivial to invent based on earlier work,
the invention should be considered part of the public domain and may
not be patented.35 For example, the invention of purple sunscreen lotion,
when all previous sunscreens were white, may be obvious if the
sunscreen is otherwise identical in its properties. If the reason for the
purple color is that the compound imparting it more effectively blocks
the sun's ultraviolet rays, then the invention may not be obvious.
Nonobviousness depends on what the ordinary level of skill is in the art
of sunscreen formulations. Therefore, whether a patent is valid often
depends on the court's characterization of Phosita.
II.

NONOBVIOUSNESS AND THE ROLE OF THE "PERSON
HAVING ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART"

Determining the level of ordinary skill in the art is a widespread
inquiry that one might expect to reflect the process of invention as it
occurs in a variety of forms. The Federal Circuit has developed standards
for defining the person having ordinary skill in the art for the purpose of
determining nonobviousness. Although the Federal Circuit declared six
factors for defining Phosita in EnvironmentalDesigns, Ltd. v. Union Oil

31. This example is similar to an actual case. See In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 1001 (Fed. Cir.
1999) (reversing holding of Board of Patent Appeals and Interventions that a plastic trash bag that
looks like a Halloween jack-o-lantern was unpatentable, not for lack of novelty, but for
obviousness).
32. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 149-50.
33. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994 & Supp. 1999).
34. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 150.
35. See id.
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Co.,36 subsequent decisions reveal inconsistent application of these
factors.
A. Development ofPhosita in the Context ofNonobviousness
In an effort to end judicial confusion about the standard of patentable
invention, Congress codified the nonobviousness requirement at 35
U.S.C. § 103 in the 1952 Patent Act.37 Under this statute, a patent will
not be granted unless an invention is nonobvious to a person having
ordinary skill in the art. 38 The landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision,
Graham v. John Deere Co.,39 spelled out the factual inquiries underlying
the nonobviousness determination, including the assessment of the skill
of Phosita. Subsequently, the Federal Circuit has emphasized the
of
importance of the Phosita determination and has set forth a series
40
Designs.
Environmental
in
Phosita
of
skill
the
measuring
for
factors
1. The Basis of the Nonobviousness Inquiry
As befits the most litigated aspect of patent law,4' nonobviousness has
eluded precise definition since it arose as a judicial construction more
than 150 years ago in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood.4" In that case, the U.S.
Supreme Court defined the standard of patentable "invention" as
requiring more ingenuity than was possessed by the "ordinary mechanic
acquainted with the business." ' Subsequently, a variety of standards for
"invention" evolved through a tangled history of court decisions at all
levels until Congress codified what it hoped would be a more

36. 713 F.2d 693 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
37. Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, § 103, 66 Stat. 798 (1952).
38. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
39. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
40. Envil. Designs, 713 F.2d at 696.
41. Between 1989 and 1996, litigants asserted the invalidity of patents for obviousness more often
than any other theory, though they succeeded only 36% of the time. Nonetheless, 42% of patents
found invalid in litigation failed for obviousness, a higher rate than for any other reason. See John R.
Allison & Mark A. Lemley, EmpiricalEvidence on the Validity of LitigatedPatents, 26 AIPLA Q.J.
185,208 (1998).
42. 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1851).
43. Id. at 266 (finding that replacing porcelain door knobs with those made of wood or glass not
patentable).
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straightforward test of patentability in section 103 of the 1952 Patent
Act.44

Section 103 of the Patent Act does not permit the grant of a patent for
a novel invention "if the differences between the subject matter sought to
be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole
would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person
having ordinary skill in the art to which the subject matter pertains."'4 5
The statute codified the ordinary mechanic of Hotchkiss as "the person
' Therefore the statutory language
having ordinary skill in the art."46
requires a decision-maker to determine in which art the invention lies,
the level of skill possessed by Phosita in that art, and whether the
invention is obvious to Phosita.
Section 103 further provides that an "[i]nvention shall not be
negatived by the manner in which the invention was made."'47 This
awkward language was intended to overrule the court-created "flash of
genius" test.4 8 The lower courts had interpreted this test as setting a very
high standard for "invention"; only inventions made by inventors in a
"flash of creative genius" were patentable.49 The federal statute's
Reviser's Note explains that "it is immaterial whether [an invention]
resulted from long toil and experimentation or from a flash of genius." 50
Nonetheless, even after enactment of section 103, the hoped-for stability
in the law of patentability proved elusive.51
Confusion over the standard for nonobviousness continued in the
lower courts,52 leading to the landmark case of Graham v. John Deere
Co. 3 in 1966. In Graham, the Supreme Court interpreted section 103 as
44. Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, § 103, 66 Stat. 798 (1952); see also 1 IRVING
KAYTON, PATENT PRACTICE 5.7-.9 (6th ed., Release 3.0 1998) (discussing the judicial history
preceding the enactment of the 1952 Patent Act).
45. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1994 & Supp. 1999).
46. Id.; see also Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1,3-4 (1966).
47. 35 U.S.C. § 103(c).
48. Graham, 383 U.S. at 15 n.7. This test originated in Cuno Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp.,
314 U.S. 84, 91 (1941).
49. Graham, 383 U.S. at 15 n.7.
50. Id. at 16 n.8 (quoting the Reviser's Note).
51. See id. at 16.
52. For an overview of the history of nonobviousness see, for example, KAYTON, supranote 44,
at 5.12-.17.
53. 383 U.S. 1 (1966). This case was one of three nonobviousness cases, known as "The Trilogy,"
which the Supreme Court decided on the same day. See James B. Gambrell & John H. Dodge II,
Ordinary Skill in the Art-An Enemy of the Inventor or a Friend of the People, in
NONOBVIOUSNESS-THE

ULTIMATE

CONDITION

OF

PATENTABILITY

5:301,

5:309

(J.
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requiring three factual inquiries to reach a conclusion on the issue of
obviousness.5 4 The fact-finder must (1) determine the scope and content
of the prior art; (2) ascertain the differences between the invention and
the prior art; and (3) determine the ordinary level of skill in the art at the
time the invention was made. The Court also noted that secondary
considerations, i.e., objective evidence such as commercial success,
long-felt but unresolved need, or skepticism of those in the art, bear on
the ultimate conclusion of nonobviousness 6 The Court urged strict
observance of these requirements for judging nonobviousness, but did
not further address the third prong of the test, the Phosita inquiry."
Consequently, it has fallen to the Federal Circuit to develop the elements
of the nonobviousness inquiry and explain the Phosita standard more
fully.
In its most recent comprehensive statement on the law of
nonobviousness, the Federal Circuit in Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co."
Witherspoon ed., 1980). At issue was the obviousness of the mode of attachment of a plow shank to
a plow frame. Graham, 383 U.S. at 4. The second case, involving Cook Chemical, was combined
with and decided in the Graham opinion. It concerned the obviousness of a new type of sprayer head
for bottles packaging liquid products such as insecticides. Id. at 4-5. The Court decided the third
case separately. See United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966).
54. See Graham, 383 U.S. at 17-18. The GrahamCourt did not clearly state whether obviousness
was a legal or factual conclusion. See id. at 17 ("While the ultimate question of patent validity is one
of law.... the § 103 condition, which is but one of three conditions, each of which must be satisfied,
lends itself to several basic factual inquiries."). The Federal Circuit has treated § 103 as a question of
law. Lawrence M. Sung, Echoes of Scientific Truth in the Halls of Justice: The Standardsof Review
Applied by the United States Courtof Appeals for the Federal Circuitin Patent-RelatedMatters, 48
AM. U. L. REV. 1233, 1295-96 n.395 (1999).
55. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17-18.
56. Id. The Federal Circuit has subsequently stressed the importance of secondary considerations
to the nonobviousness analysis, calling them "often ... the most probative and cogent evidence in
the record." Stratoflex, Inc., v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1983). It has even
referred to secondary considerations as the fourth inquiry of Graham. Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v.
Bames-Hind/Hydrocurve, Inc., 796 F.2d 443, 447 (Fed. Cir. 1986). However, some of the factors,
such as commercial success, have been criticized as nonprobative of obviousness. See generally
Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives on
Innovation, 76 CAL. L. REv. 805 (1988) (arguing that the use of commercial success to assess the
non-obviousness of an invention rewards non-technical achievement such as superior marketing
rather than true inventive advances). Nonetheless, factors such as long-felt but unsolved need in the
art for a solution to a problem and the prior failure of others to make the invention have been
accorded more value. See id. at 862-66.
57. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17-18. Although the Supreme Court later strayed from this analysis in
subsequent cases, the Federal Circuit continues to rely on the Graham analysis. See KAYrON, supra
note 44, at 5.12-.17; see also Ag Pro, Inc. v. Sakraida, 425 U.S. 273, 282-83 (1976); Anderson'sBlack Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57, 59-61 (1969). The Supreme Court has not
substantively addressed nonobviousness since these opinions.
58. 234 F.3d 654 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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explained the Graham analysis and reiterated the necessity of Graham
findings as a precursor to invalidating a patent for obviousness.59 As to
the first Graham factor, the Ruiz court held that the scope and content of
the prior art include that which is "reasonably pertinent to the particular
problem with which the invention was involved." 60 In a nonobviousness
analysis, no single prior art reference contains all the elements of the
invention because of the differences between the claimed invention and
the prior art.61 The party asserting invalidity of a patent for
nonobviousness must therefore rely on the modification of a single
reference or the combination of two or more references to arrive at the
claimed subject matter.62
To guard against a finding of obviousness based on a hindsight
reconstruction of the invention, the Federal Circuit requires a factual
finding that a "suggestion... or motivation in the prior art or
elsewhere... would have led one of ordinary skill in the art to [modify
or] combine the references."'63 Motivation may come from the prior art
itself, from knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art, or from the
nature of the problem to be solved.' Hence, the suggestion/motivation
test ensures that on the question of what constitutes pertinent art, the
decision-maker will not substitute her own judgment for that of a Phosita
at the time the invention was made.
In relation to the second prong of Graham,the Ruiz court held that the
fact-finder must not simply compare differences between the prior art
and the invention on an element-by-element basis. Instead, the factfinder must judge the nonobviousness of the invention as a whole.65
Finally, the Ruiz court emphasized that the determination of the level
of ordinary skill in the art is an integral part of the Graham analysis and
59. Id. at 663.
60. Id. at 664 (quoting Stratoflex, 713 F.2d at 1535). Pertinent art includes those references that
fall vithin the technological field of the claimed invention and any analogous technology. 2 PETER
D. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 9.02[2][a][i] (2000). Only those references that
became publicly available prior to the date of invention may be considered. Id. Prior art constitutes
"analogous art" "when a person of ordinary skill would reasonably have consulted those references
and applied their teachings when attempting to solve the same problem as the inventor." Id. at

§ 9.03.
61. See Ruiz, 234 F.3d at 664-65.
62. Id. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE
§ 2143.01 (7th ed. 1998) [hereinafter PTO MANUAL].
63. Ruiz, 234 F.3d at 664.
64. See id. at 665.
65. Id. (quoting Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1383 (Fed. Cir.
1986)).

Washington Law Review

Vol. 77:267, 2002

is critical to a proper assessment of obviousness.6 6 Without such a
determination, there is no standard by which to judge the obviousness or
nonobviousness of an invention.67 Thus, although it may sometimes be
avoided, many lower courts attempt some finding on the level of skill in
the art. 8 While the Ruiz court listed factors by which a decision-maker
might determine the level of ordinary skill in the art, it did not review
key attributes of the Phosita construct.6 9 The remainder of this section
explores the guidance the Federal Circuit has provided for measuring the
skill level of Phosita.
2.

IdentifyingPhositaand Measuringthe Level of OrdinarySkill in
the Art: The FactorsofEnvironmental Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil
Co.

The person having ordinary skill in the art is a hypothetical person
who is presumed to know all the relevant art within the field of invention
and any analogous technical fields.7" She is not the judge, a layman, one
skilled in remote arts, or a genius in the art at hand." Phosita is not the
inventor, but rather an uncreative person that thinks along conventional
lines, never seeking to innovate.72 In contrast, inventors possess some
indefinable quality setting them apart from the person of ordinary skill.73
Hence, the test does not ask what would have been subjectively obvious
to the inventor. 74 Instead the court must determine whether the invention
would have been objectively obvious to the hypothetical person having
ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made. Without
evaluation from the perspective of one of ordinary skill in the art, most
inventions would be deemed obvious because the decision-maker could

66. Id. at 666.
67. See id.
68. See infra Part II.B. The Ruiz court noted that failure to make an explicit factual finding on the
level of ordinary skill is not always reversible error. Ruiz, 234 F.3d at 667 (citing Kloster Speedsteel
AB v. Crucible Inc., 793 F.2d 1565, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). When an invention is obvious to one of
the lowest skill level or nonobvious to one of the highest skill level, a specific finding on Phosita is
unnecessary. Kloster,793 F.2d at 1573-74.
69. Ruiz, 234 F.3d at 666-67. The factors are discussed infra notes 76-95 and accompanying text.
70. See Standard Oil Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448,454 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
71. See Envtl. Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 697 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
72. StandardOil, 774 F.2d at 454.
73. Id.
74. Ryko Mfg. Co. v. Nu-Star, Inc., 950 F.2d 714,718 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
75. Id.
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merely piece together elements from the prior art using the invention as a
blueprint.76 Deciding whether a Phosita would choose the exact prior art
references from among the thousands or even tens of thousands in a field
to create7 the claimed invention is the crux of the nonobviousness
7
inquiry.
Early in its existence the Federal Circuit discussed the importance of
determining the level of skill in the art and set out factors for making this
determination. In 1983, the court in OrthopedicEquipment Co. v. United
States78 (Orthopedic1) drew on a pre-Federal Circuit decision, Jacobson
Brothers, Inc. v. United States,79 which enumerated five factors relevant
to the determination of the level of skill of the ordinary person.8
Subsequently, in Orthopedic Equipment Co. v. All Orthopedic
Appliances, Inc.8 1 (Orthopedic I1), the Federal Circuit introduced the
inventor's level of education as a factor to consider, though the court
noted that this factor was not conclusive." Later in 1983, the Federal
Circuit consolidated the factors of Orthopedic I and II to create the
83
current test.
In EnvironmentalDesigns, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co.,84 the Federal Circuit
held that the following factors were relevant to determining level of skill
in the art: (1) educational level of the inventor; (2) type of problems
encountered in the art; (3) prior art solutions to those problems; (4)
rapidity with which inventions are made; (5) sophistication of the
technology; and (6) educational level of active workers in the field.85
While the lower courts, struggling to follow section 103, have often
quoted these factors,86 the Federal Circuit has had little to say about how
76. See id.
77. See Gambrell & Dodge, supranote 53, at 5:326.
78. 702 F.2d 1005 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
79. 512 F.2d 1065 (Ct. Cl. 1975) (adopting opinion originally published in 184 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
181,185).
80. See OrthopedicI, 702 F.2d at 1011 (citing Jacobson Bros., 512 F.2d at 1011).
81. 707 F.2d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
82. Id. at 1382.

83. See Envtl. Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 696 (1983).
84. 713 F.2d 693 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
85. Id. at 696. The court presented the factors as part of its review of the district court's
nonobviousness determination. Because the parties agreed that their experts at trial were
representative of Phosita, the Federal Circuit did not rule on this point. Id. at 697. The court affirmed
the lower court's finding that the defendant's patent for removing sulfur from gas streams was

nonobvious over the prior art. Id.
86. According to an online search by the author on November 30, 2001, at least 80 lower court
decisions have cited five or more of the factors. See, eg., N. Am. Oil Co. v. Star Brite Distrib., Inc.,
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to use them. The only guidance the Environmental Designs court
provided was that not all the factors may be present in every case and
any factor might predominate in a Phosita determination.87 With but two
exceptions, neither the precedent the court relied on for the factors, nor
subsequent Federal Circuit opinions, have addressed how to use these
factors in measuring the skill level of Phosita."
B.

Application of the Environmental Designs Factors

In five subsequent nonobviousness opinions citing the factors of
Environmental Designs, the Federal Circuit has provided little guidance
for the use of the factors. 9 The purpose of considering the inventor's
education level is unclear and this factor has led to confusion in the
lower courts.9" While the Federal Circuit has not further addressed the
educational level of active workers in the field, the lower courts have
occasionally read this factor to include experience and knowledge."
Similarly, the Federal Circuit has been silent with regard to the rapidity
of innovation and the sophistication of technology factors. In just one
decision, In re GPAC Inc.,9 has the Federal Circuit substantively
discussed the role of the factors, specifically prior art problems and
solutions, in a nonobviousness inquiry.93 The following sections outline
the Federal Circuit's and other courts' treatment of the Environmental
Designs factors.

148 F. Supp. 2d 1351, 1361 (N.D. Ga. 2001); Imperial Chem. Indus., P.L.C. v. Danbury Pharm., Inc.
777 F. Supp. 330, 371 (D. Del. 1991); Boots Laboratories, Inc. v. Burroughs Wellcome, Co., 223
USPQ 840, 848 (E.D. Va. 1984).
87. Envil. Designs,713 F.2d at 696-97.
88. See infra Part II.B.4.
89. See Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 234 F.3d 654, 666-67 (Fed. Cir. 2000); In re GPAC Inc., 57
F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Ryko Mfg. Co. v. Nu-Star, Inc., 950 F.2d 714, 718 (Fed. Cir.
1991); Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc, 807 F.2d 955, 962-63 (Fed. Cir. 1986);
Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. Bames-Hind/Hydrocurve, Inc., 796 F.2d 443,449-50 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
90. See infra Part II.B.1.
91. See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. JBL, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 2d 138, 155 (D. Mass. 2000) (finding that one
skilled in the art of loudspeaker design has two to three years of such experience, and is familiar
with aerodynamics, fluid flow mechanics, and acoustics).
92. 57 F.3d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
93. Id. at 1579.
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1.

EducationalLevel of the Inventor

Without providing a clear rationale for doing so, the Federal Circuit
has considered the educational level of the inventor in Phosita
determinations.94 On the one hand, the court has made clear that Phosita
is not the inventor." The subjective condition of the mind of the
inventor and the actual skill of the inventor are irrelevant to the
determination of nonobviousness.9 7 On the other hand, in the progeny of
Environmental Designs, the Federal Circuit has often included the
educational level of the inventor as a factor to consider in assessing
Phosita.95 The court has on occasion de-emphasized the inventor's
education factor by not including it as part of its list of factors.99 Yet, as
in Orthopedic H, the court has also noted that the inventor's educational
level is not determinative of nonobviousness, but in doing so, implied
that the factor is still relevant to the Phosita inquiry.' 0 Thus, tension
exists between the Federal Circuit's insistence that an inventor's level of
education may be a component in the determination of the ordinary level
of skill in the art and its prohibition on considering what the inventor
would have done if faced with the same prior art."0 '
Lower courts and the PTO continue to consider the inventor's level of
education as promulgated by EnvironmentalDesigns and its precursors.
For example, the PTO includes educational level of the inventor and the
other five factors in the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP),
the reference that PTO personnel employ when examining patents.0
94. Use of this factor implies that the inventor is representative of Phosita and that educational
level is relevant to skill level. See KAYTON, supra note 44, at 5.22.
95. See Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
96. Ryko Mfg. Co. v. Nu-Star, Inc., 950 F.2d 714,718 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (citing Kloster Speedsteel
AB v. Crucible Inc., 793 F.2d 1565, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
97. See, eg., Stewart-Wamer Corp. v. City of Pontiac, 767 F.2d 1563, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
("[S]ection 103 is not concerned with the actual skill of the inventors-whose skill may be
extraordinary-but rather with the level of ordinary skill in the art.").
98. See, e.g., Ryko, 950 F.2d at 718; Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. Bames-Hind/Hydrocurve, Inc., 796
F.2d 443,449 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
99. See, e-g., Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir.
1986).
100. Id. at 961. Subsequently, in Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 234 F.3d 654, 666-67 (Fed. Cir. 2000),
the court cited the list of factors from Custom-Accessories but did not mention the inventor's level of
education at all.
101. Standard Oil Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 454 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("[O]ne should
not go about determining obviousness under § 103 by inquiring into what patentees (i.e., inventors)
would have knovn or would likely have done, faced with the revelations of references.").
102. See PTO MANUAL,supra note 62, § 2141.03.
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More than half of the district court cases that explicitly refer to the
Phosita factors consider the inventor's education factor.' 3 In some
instances, the opinions go further and liken the inventor to Phosita. For
example, the court in Imperial Chemical Industries, PLC v. Danbury
Pharmacal1° (IC1) noted that the inventor's education and experience
matched that of Phosita10 5 The court went on to find the patent on a
successful drug for the treatment of hypertension invalid for
obviousness.0 6 The intensely fact-dependent nature of the
nonobviousness inquiry makes it difficult to determine whether a
decision such as this one is incorrect.'0 7 Nonetheless, cases such as ICI
raise the possibility that the Federal Circuit's own factors may lead a
judge to equate Phosita with the inventor, a fallacy the Federal Circuit
has continually warned against.'08 The fact that jury instructions typically
include the inventor's education factor also increases the potential for
confusion.'0 9 Therefore, consideration of the inventor's education level
has proven to be problematic.
2.

EducationalLevel ofActive Workers in the Field

While the Federal Circuit has not commented on the use of the
educational level of active workers in the field, district courts often
attribute a particular level of education to Phosita. Educational levels
may span the range from nearly nonexistent, such as in the art of fly

103. An online search by the author of district court cases from March 1983, the date of
Orthopedic I, through Nov. 2001 reveals 38 nonobviousness cases citing the inventor's education
factor out of a total of 80 cases citing at least 5 of the factors. (This list does not include jury trials
but only bench trials and summary judgment rulings.) See, e.g., Graham v. Gun-Munro, No. C-9904064 CRB, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7110, *17 (N.D. Cal. May 22, 2001); Sunrise Med. HHG, Inc.
v. Airsep Corp., 95 F. Supp. 2d 348, 453 (W.D. Penn. 2000); Biacore, AB v. Thermo Bioanalysis
Corp., 79 F. Supp. 2d 422,464 (D. Del. 1999).
104. 777 F. Supp. 330 (D. Del. 1991).
105. Id. at 352.
106. Seeid. at 373.
107. Many times courts have trouble deciding the correct outcome for obviousness inquiries. See,
e.g., Litton Sys., Inc. v. Honeywell Inc., 87 F.3d 1559, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (noting that the
obviousness inquiry is highly fact-specific and reversing the lower court's grant of judgment as a
matter of law that had overturned ajury's finding of nonobviousness).
108. See supranotes 94-96 and accompanying text.
109. See, e.g., DUANE BURTON, JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CASES
§ 20:43:57 (1991).
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wraps for the legs of horses,'" to highly advanced, like those involved in
drug discovery."' Courts have often specified a range of disciplines in
which the Phosita may hold an educational degree. For example, in Bose
Corp. v. JBL, Inc.,"' the court found that a Phosita of loudspeaker design
held a "bachelor of science degree in either electrical engineering,
physics, mechanical engineering, or possibly acoustics."" 3 Some courts
have also made findings on the length of experience and the knowledge
of sub-disciplines in which Phosita specializes."1 The Bose court, for
example, found that Phosita was "familiar with aerodynamics, fluid flow
mechanics, and acoustics, and would have worked as a loudspeaker
designer for two to three years.' 1 5 These types of findings show that the
district courts have routinely gone beyond a bare statement of the
education level of active workers in the field to consider experience and
knowledge in characterizing the skill of Phosita.
3.

Rapidity ofInnovation andSophistication of the Technology

The Federal Circuit has not addressed the use of the rapidity of
innovation factor, and the lower courts have only rarely confronted the
issue." 6 In StudiengesellschaftKohle mbH v. DartIndustries,Inc.,117 the
accused infringer argued that the invention, a method of making
polymers, was obvious because of rapid progress by a third party toward
the same invention."' The court rejected this characterization, in part
because it rejected the implied assumption that the inventor, later a Nobel
laureate, and the third party, DuPont, were representative of ordinary
skill in the art of polymer chemistry. 19 Similarly, the trial court in
110. See Graham v. Gun-Munro, No. C-99-04064 CRB, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7110, *19 (N.D.
Cal. May 22, 2001) (finding Phosita to be a person with some formal education but no special skills
or training in the relevant art).
11. See Imperial Chem. Indus., PLC v. Danbury Pharmacal, Inc., 777 F. Supp. 330, 371 (D. Del.
1991) (finding Phosita to be a Ph.D. organic chemist).
112. 112 F. Supp. 2d 138 (D. Mass. 2000).
113. Id. at 155.
114. See, eg., Sunrise Med. HHG, Inc. v. AirSep Corp., 95 F. Supp. 2d 348, 401-02 (W.D. Pa.

2000).
115. Bose, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 155.
116. An online search by the author of Federal Circuit precedent through November of 2001 did
not reveal any nonobviousness cases containing "rapidity of innovation" or related terms other than
those discussed in this article. See infra note 126.
117. 549 F. Supp. 716 (D. Del. 1982).
118. Id. at 727.
119. Seeid. at732,735.
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Northern Telecom v. Datapoint'21 found unpersuasive the argument that
the level of skill in computer science was high because of rapid technical
evolution and a high level of sophistication in the technology. 121 Instead,
the court relied primarily on the education of active workers in the field
and their experience to ascertain the skill level of Phosita. 122 Thus, these
cases shed little light on the use of the rapidity factor, and most lower
courts that have explicitly cited the Environmental Designs factors
ignore the rapidity factor.
Similarly, others have not found the rapidity factor to be useful. The
American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA), for example,
has not included the rapidity of innovation factor in its model jury
instructions." In addition, commentators disagree as to the inference to
be drawn from the rapidity of innovation factor.2 4 For instance, in the
context of a discussion of nonobviousness and biotechnology, one
commentator noted that a fast-moving technology will not necessarily
continue to progress at the same rate if patents were unavailable." z
Therefore, both courts and commentators have recognized the difficulty
in applying this factor.
In addition, the five nonobviousness decisions citing Environmental
Designs or its progeny have not directly explained what effect the
sophistication of the technology should have on the determination of
Phosita. 26 In its discussion of prior art problems and solutions in In re
GPAC Ine., 27 the Federal Circuit implied that because it found the

120. 9 U.S.P.Q.2d 1577 (N.D. Tex. 1988).
121. Id. at 1625.
122. Id.
123. AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW ASSOCIATION, GUIDE TO JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN
PATENT CASES 25-29 (1990).
124. Compare Judith A. Szepesi, Maximizing Protection for Computer Software, 12 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 173, 179 (1996) (assuming that the rapid advances in
computer software indicate a high level of skill by programmers) with Schlicher, supra note 13, at
131.
125. Schlicher, supra note 13, at 131.
126. See Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 234 F.3d 654, 666-67 (Fed. Cir. 2000); In re GPAC Inc., 57
F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Ryko Mfg. Co. v. Nu-Star, Inc., 950 F.2d 714, 718 (Fed. Cir.
1991); Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc, 807 F.2d 955, 962-63 (Fed. Cir. 1986);
Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. Bames-Hind/Hydrocurve, Inc., 796 F.2d 443,449-50 (Fed. Cir. 1986); see
also U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc., 103 F.3d 1554, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (citing a similar list
of factors from jury instructions on nonobviousness during a review of the validity of the
instructions).
127 57 F.3d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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28
technology somewhat sophisticated, the skill of Phosita was high.1
However, in a related inquiry, the Federal Circuit has downplayed the
significance of technological complexity in its motivation/suggestion test
for nonobviousness.' 2 For example, in In re Dembiczak,130 the Federal
Circuit noted that in the case of "less technologically complex
inventions" it was especially important to make a factual finding of some
motivation or teaching to combine prior art references before reaching a
conclusion of obviousness.' 3 ' In the context of a complex art, such as
satellite communications, the court in In re Rouffet 3 2 again ignored the
focused
on the
technology
and
of the
sophistication
3
3
motivation/suggestion test. Although the Phosita was found to be
highly skilled, the court affirmed that motivation cannot come solely
from a high level of skill in the art.134 While commentary predating the
Federal Circuit noted a tendency in the courts to equate technological
complexity with nonobviousness and simplicity with obviousness, 3 ' the
Federal Circuit has rejected such a straightforward connection.
Therefore, the proper application of the sophistication of technology
factor is unclear.

4.

PriorArt Problemsand Solutions

Jacobson Brothers, Inc. v. United States3 6 illustrates the use of the
prior art factors in a level of ordinary skill inquiry.'37 In Jacobson, the
licensee of a patent for an underwater salvage device employing closedcircuit TV sued the U.S. Navy for infringing the patent in its use of three
deep-water torpedo recovery rigs.'38 Among its defenses, the Navy

128. See id. at 1579-80; see also supraPart II.B.2.
129. The motivation/suggestion test is discussed supra Part II.A.1.
130. 175 F.3d 994 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
131. See id. at 999-1000. The patent application at issue in Dembiczak concerned a trash bag
designed to look like a pumpkin when full. The court reversed the Examiner's rejection for
obviousness vhich the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences had upheld. Id. at 1000.
132. 149 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
133. See id. at 1355-59.
134. Id. at 1356-57, 1359. As noted above, motivation to modify or combine prior art references
can come from knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art. See supra Part II.A. 1.
135. Gambrell & Dodge, supra note 53, at 5:322-24.
136. 512 F.2d 1065 (Ct. Cl. 1975).
137. See generally id. at 1065 (adopting opinion originally published in 184 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 181
(Ct. Cl. 1974)).
138. See id. at 1066-67.
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asserted that Jacobson's patent was invalid for obviousness.'39 The court
agreed that the Navy devices would infringe the licensee's patent if the
patent were valid. 4 ° The patented and infringing devices each consisted
of an underwater television camera and lights mounted on a frame with a
grasping claw. 4 ' The rig was maneuvered on the ocean floor by means
of a system of cables, pulleys, and winches.'42 This maneuvering system
was critical for maintaining the stability of the rig in deep water
operations.43 The point of dispute was whether it was obvious to
combine an underwater salvage device equipped with a TV camera and
lights with a maneuvering system comprised of cables, pulleys, and
winches.' The Court of Claims, adopting the trial court's opinion, found
the patent invalid for obviousness.' 45
Because it had no other evidence, the Court of Claims evaluated the
level of skill by considering the prior art references containing the main
elements of the invention-the salvage rig with underwater TV and the
maneuvering system.14 The court approached this task by comparing the
prior art problem to the problem solved by the invention. 47 It found that
each problem concerned the maneuvering of a device in the presence of
underwater currents and tides.' 48 The court compared the prior art
solution to the patented solution and found them to employ essentially
identical systems of cables, pulleys, and winches. 4 1 Hence, the court
reasoned inductively from the prior art problems/solutions, deciding that
and prior art. 150
the logical gap was small between the invention
5
Therefore, the invention was obvious to Phosita.' '

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
camera
Id.
149.
150.
151.

Id. at 1068.
See id.
See id. at 1067-68.
Id. at 1067.
Id. at 1069.
Id. at 106869.
Id. at 1073.
Id. at 1071.
Id.
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the court assumed that a frame-mounted TV
did not present any maneuvering or stability problems different from those of a diving bell.
Id. at 1071-72.
Id.
Id. at 1073.
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Since Jacobson, only one Federal Circuit case, In re GPAC, has
addressed the use of the prior art factors in a nonobviousness analysis.'52
In that case, the applicant appealed a final rejection by the Board of
Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) for obviousness in a re-4
1l
examination'53 of a patent for an asbestos removal containment system.
BPAI had not made a "specific finding" on the ordinary skill in the art,
but instead cited the factors of EnvironmentalDesigns and relied on the
level of skill displayed by the prior art. '55 The applicant argued that the
board had ignored its expert evidence of a low skill level in the field,
apparently based on education level of active workers.'56
The Federal Circuit upheld the Board's finding of obviousness, 57 but
did not follow the sort of analysis the Court of Claims made in Jacobson.
Instead, the Federal Circuit found that one of the prior art references
showed the prior art problems and potential solutions to be "somewhat
sophisticated" because asbestos is a hazardous material and is therefore
difficult to work with.' 51The court also commented that because asbestos
removal was a highly regulated industry, a high level of skill was
required.' 59 For these reasons, the court found no clear error in the
Board's determination, despite contradictory evidence of a low level of
skill proffered by the appellant. 6 Therefore, the Federal Circuit upheld
BPAI's finding of a high level of skill in the art and a conclusion of
obviousness, based in part on a subjective characterization of the prior art
problems and solutions rather than on what those problems and solutions
taught one of ordinary skill in the art.'
Courts have proven to be uneven in their application of the
EnvironmentalDesigns factors. While some factors such as the level of

152. In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
153. Id. at 1575. A reexamination occurs when the PTO examines an issued patent again in light

of new prior art or new argument by the patentee or a third party. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 301-02 (1994 &
Supp. 1999).
154. See GPAC, 57 F.3d at 1576; see also Ex parte GPAC Inc., 29 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1401, 1401
(B.P.A.I. 1993).
155. GPAC, 57 F.3d at 1579; Ex parte GPAC, 29 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1432 (citing the Environmental
Designs factors as set forth in Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Industries,Inc., 807 F.2d
955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
156. GPAC, 57 F.3d at 1579; Ex parte GPAC, 29 U.S.P.Q 2d at 1432.
157. GPAC, 57 F.3d at 1584.

158. Id. at 1579.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1579-80.
161. Seeid.

Washington Law Review

Vol. 77:267, 2002

education of active workers in the field have been broadly interpreted,
other factors such as the rapidity of innovation have been virtually
ignored. Still others, such as the inventor's education level and
sophistication of the technology, seem to confuse lower courts. Such
problems in application suggest that the current test for Phosita should be
reevaluated and adjusted to better reflect the intent behind the Phosita
inquiry.
III. CURRENT FEDERAL CIRCUIT METHODOLOGY FOR
DETERMINING THE LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE
ART DOES NOT ADVANCE THE NONOBVIOUSNESS
INQUIRY
A number of the current Federal Circuit factors for determining the
level of ordinary skill should be abandoned or modified because they do
not advance the nonobviousness inquiry. Consideration of the
educational level of the inventor contravenes the patent statute and the
Federal Circuit's own precedent. This factor thus frustrates the purpose
of the skill inquiry and confuses lower courts. The educational level of
workers active in the field is also insufficient to determine the technical
skill level of Phosita. Finally, the rapidity of innovation and
sophistication of technology factors are indeterminate and therefore not
probative of the level of ordinary skill question.
A.

Considerationof the Inventor's Level ofEducation Contravenes
PatentLaw and Confuses Lower Courts

The inventor's education factor contradicts statute, precedent, and the
purpose of the Phosita inquiry.'62 The plain language of the first sentence
of section 103 requires obviousness to be assessed from the perspective
of the hypothetical "person having ordinary skill in the art."' 63 It does not
mention or otherwise invoke analysis of the inventor. The Supreme
Court's opinion in Graham v. John Deere Co. is consistent with this
straightforward interpretation."6 The statute also declares that,
"[p]atentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the
162. See KAYTON, supra note 44, at 5.22.
163. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1994 & Supp. 1999).
164. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966) (holding that under section 103 the
ordinary skill in the art must be resolved and not imposing any further requirement related to the
invention).
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invention was made."' 6 This provision overruled the "flash of creative
genius" test of invention,1 66 and led the Federal Circuit to hold that the
subjective condition of the inventor's mind at the time of invention is
irrelevant to patentability.1 67 Further, the Federal Circuit has stated that
the skill of the inventor is irrelevant in determining the level of ordinary
skill in the art.168 Thus, "one should not go about determining
obviousness under section 103 by inquiring into what patentees (i.e.,
inventors) would have known or would likely have done, faced with the
revelations of references."' 69 Because an inventor's level of education
serves as an indication of her skill and knowledge, to accord with statute
and precedent, this factor should be removed from the determination of
ordinary skill in the art.
The inventor's education factor also flies in the face of the purpose
underlying the Graham factors: preventing the fact-finder from
employing hindsight in the nonobviousness inquiry.'70 This factor
practically invites juries and judges to equate Phosita with the
inventor.' When this happens, as in ICI, conclusions of obviousness
are tainted by the suspicion that the decision-maker reconstructed the
invention using the inventor's patent as a blueprint. The continuing
reliance of the PTO and the lower courts on this factor-through its use
in the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure and jury instructionsunderscores the potential for engaging in inadvertent hindsight. 4 The
inventor's educational level may be higher or lower than that of the
hypothetical person. To the extent that an inventor's educational
credentials are used to determine the level of ordinary skill, that level
165. 35 U.S.C. § 103(c).
166. Graham, 383 U.S. at 15. The "flash of creative genius" test required the inventor to have
conceived of an invention in a near instantaneous fashion to render the invention patentable, and
originated in Cuno Eng'g Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84,91 (1941).

167. See Ryko Mfg. Co. v. Nu-Star, Inc., 950 F.2d 714, 718 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (citing Kioster
Speedsteel AB v. Crucible Inc., 793 F.2d 1565, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
168. Standard Oil Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448,454 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Stewart-Warner
Corp. v. City of Pontiac, 767 F.2d 1563, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("[S]ection 103 is not concerned with
the actual skill of the inventors-whose skill may be extraordinary-but rather with the level of
ordinary skill in the art.").
169. StandardOil, 774 F.2d at 454 (emphasis in original).
170. Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 234 F.3d 654,664 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
171. See supraPart II.B.1.
172. Imperial Chem. Indus., PLC v. Danbury Pharmacal, Inc., 777 F. Supp. 330, 371-72 (D. Del.

1991).
173. See supraPart II.B.1.
174. See id.
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may be quite different from the actual level in a particular field. 75 While
the Federal Circuit has occasionally de-emphasized this factor, it should
end the possibility for confusion of the inventor's skill with that of
Phosita once and for all by rejecting the inventor's education level as a
factor in the Phosita determination.
B.

The EducationalLevel ofActive Workers Is Insufficient To Define a
Phosita's TechnicalKnow-How

Determining the educational level of workers active in the field is only
a starting point for defining the level of ordinary skill. Lower courts, to
the extent that they make findings on this factor, often go beyond a bare
bones description of educational level. 176 They include not only a variety
of educational backgrounds that a Phosita may possess, but also the
specialized knowledge and length of experience such a person would
have. 7 7 This analysis is appropriate because the specialized knowledge
needed to practice in a particular art often comes from job experience
rather than formal education. In addition, although a scientist with a
graduate degree possesses certain fundamental knowledge common
throughout a field, such a scientist also possesses know-how unique to
the handful of sub-disciplines in which she works. 7 Thus, formal
education rarely defines the total technical knowledge of a Phosita and
should not be used as a proxy for a Phosita's level of skill.
C.

Two Factorsof Environmental Designs Are Not Probativeof the
Level of OrdinarySkill in the Art Inquiry

Two factors set forth in Environmental Designs-the rapidity with
which innovations are made and the sophistication of the technologyare not probative of the level of ordinary skill in the art. These factors are

175. See Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(noting that "[r]eal inventors, as a class, vary in their capacities from ignorant geniuses to Nobel
laureates").
176. See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. JBL, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 2d 138, 155 (D. Mass. 2000) (finding that
Phosita could have a variety of educational backgrounds, would be familiar with aerodynamics, fluid
flow mechanics, and acoustics, and would have two to three years experience in loudspeaker
design).
177. See, e.g., id.
178. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Collaborative Research: Conflicts on Authorship.
Ownership, and Accountability, 53 VAND. L. REv. 1161, 1171 (2000) (noting that in biomedicine it
is impossible for any one person to know enough to advance the field).
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ambiguous and therefore indeterminate, and the Federal Circuit has not
adequately explained how to apply them. Therefore, the factors provide
no assistance to district courts or the patent office in deciding whether
claimed subject matter would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill
in the art at the time of the invention.
The "rapidity with which innovations are made" factor does not
exhibit a simple relationship to the level of ordinary skill in the art.' 79 If a
field is rapidly advancing, does that imply a high level of skill by
practitioners or does it simply mean that a large amount of money is
being invested in research? Alternatively, there may be a low level of
skill because the field is young, but the field may be advancing rapidly
because the easy experiments are being done first or a new analytical
technique has cleared the path for investigation. The Federal Circuit has
been silent as to which, if any, of these presumptions to employ in a
particular situation, and rapidity of innovation has rarely been argued in
the district courts. 8 Therefore, the factor is ambiguous and confusing to
courts attempting to define Phosita and should be abandoned.
Like the "rapidity of innovations" factor, it is unclear as to which
direction "sophistication of the technology" should lead a court in
determining Phosita. If the technology in an art is less sophisticated, does
that mean its practitioners are less sophisticated and therefore more likely
to find inventions nonobvious? On the other hand, does a less
sophisticated art imply that one of ordinary skill will find more
inventions obvious because the technology is so easy to understand?
Alternatively, are the practitioners of a sophisticated art also more
sophisticated and therefore more likely to find inventions in that art
obvious? Or, finally, does the sophistication of the art make it more
likely that one of ordinary skill in the art will find inventions nonobvious
because of the complexity of the art? The Federal Circuit has not
answered these questions.
The Federal Circuit has also not explained how the sophistication of
technology in an art should influence the finding of the level of ordinary
skill in the art. At the end of the year 2000, only five of the court's
nonobviousness opinions cited the factors of EnvironmentalDesigns, and
none commented further on the sophistication factor. 8 ' In a slightly

179. See, e.g., Schlicher, supranote 13, at 131 (noting that it is unclear how to apply the rapidity

of innovation factor).
180. See supra Part ll.B.3.
181. See supranote 126.
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different context, the Federal Circuit has stated that, without more, a high
level of skill in a sophisticated art is insufficient to render an invention
obvious from selected prior art references.182 Without making reference
to level of skill at all, the Federal Circuit has also found that a
technologically simple invention cannot be rendered obvious because of
its simplicity alone. 83 While consistent with the court's requirement of
evidence of some suggestion or motivation to combine prior art
references,' 84 these statements appear to make the sophistication of the
technology irrelevant to the level of ordinary skill. Further, they imply, at
the very least, a diminished role for using the level of skill in the art in
reaching a nonobviousness judgment.
Although the Federal Circuit has developed a six-factor test for
defining Phosita, several factors have proven to be unnecessary or
unhelpful. Others require further development before they can be
properly applied. The Federal Circuit should continue to develop the
Phosita factors to more accurately reflect the level of ordinary skill in the
art.
lV. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT SHOULD REPLACE THE
ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGNS FACTORS TO BETTER
REFLECT THE PERSPECTIVE OF PHOSITA
The Federal Circuit should replace most of the EnvironmentalDesigns
factors with subtests designed to more closely reflect the challenge
presented by an inventive problem and how Phosita thinks about the
problem. The revised factors should include (1) the predictability of the
art; (2) experience of active workers in the field; (3) the prior art
problems and solutions; and (4) long-felt need and failure of others as
direct evidence of the ordinary skill in the art. Together, these factors
advance the nonobviousness inquiry by focusing on whether the level of
ordinary skill can bridge the logical gap between the prior art and the
invention.
A.

The Predictabilityof an Art BearsDirectly on the Skill ofPhosita

Although the sophistication of a technology is not a useful factor in
measuring the level of ordinary skill in an art, the idea that the state of an
182. See In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
183. See In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 999 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
184. Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 234 F.3d 654, 665 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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art may affect its obviousness to Phosita is reasonable. The predictability
of a technology, unlike its sophistication, has a direct bearing on whether
the worker of ordinary skill will find an invention obvious.' 85 A field
may be complex, but relatively predictable in its application." 6 To solve
a problem of type X in computer programming, it may be typical to
apply algorithm Y. The algorithm may have many parts, requiring a
sophisticated understanding of mathematics to know when it should be
applied. Yet the algorithm will often work in a new context as a Phosita
expects, making developments using the algorithm more likely to be
found obvious. 7 In contrast, organic chemists often find that standard,
88
chemical transformations do not succeed in new classes of molecules.'
In other words, in an unpredictable art like organic chemistry, a solution
to a problem may be obvious to try, yet nonobvious if Phosita1 8cannot
9
have a reasonable expectation of success under the circumstances.
To be useful to the Phosita determination, the fact-finder should not
simply categorize whole disciplines as predictable or unpredictable.
Courts should recognize that the level of predictability in an art can
change over time. A fact-finder should examine the predictability of the
particular field of invention on a case-by-case basis. For example,
biotechnology has been classified as an unpredictable art. 9' However, a
wide range of understanding exists with regard to various aspects of this
technology, and each sub-area is constantly advancing.' 91 That which
was unpredictable early on may well mature into a predictable area in the
future. 192 For example, the Federal Circuit in Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai
PharmaceuticalCo., 93 and later Fiers v. Revel, 9 4 ruled that conception,
185. See, ag., Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-wiley Corp., 837 F.2d 1044, 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(finding that the inability of an expert in the field "to predict the result [the invention] would have on
a tractor-trailer vehicle" suggests the nonobviousness of the invention).
186. See, e.g., N. Telecom, Inc. v. Datapoint Corp., 908 F.2d 931, 941-43 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(holding certain claims valid, in the context of enablement, although the specification did not
disclose a key subroutine in a program because the court found that one of ordinary skill would
understand how to write such a subroutine without undue experimentation).
187. See, e.g., id.
188. Derived from personal experience of the author, a Ph.D. organic chemist.
189. See, e.g., Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai, 927 F.2d 1200, 1207-09 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
190. See, eg., Brian P. O'Shaughnessy, The FalseInventive Genus: Developing a New Approach
for Analyzing the Sufficiency of Patent Disclosure Within the Unpredictable Arts, 7 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &ENT. L.J. 147 n.12 (1996).
191. See, e.g., id.
192. See, e.g., Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362, 1374 n.10 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
193. Amgen. Inc., 927 F.2d at 1200.
194. 984 F.2d 1164 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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and therefore invention, of a new gene sequence does not occur until the
inventor clones and isolates the gene. 9 ' From this reasoning flowed, in
part, the holdings of In re Bell'96 and In re Deuel197 Those opinions held
that a gene sequence is nonobvious when only a protein sequence is
known, despite the fact that one skilled in the art could clone the gene
based on such knowledge. 98 One commentator has argued that these
holdings may lack precedential value in the future because cloning has
become much more routine and predictable since the times of the
inventions at issue in Bell and Deuel.'99 This example illustrates that the
predictability of an art more accurately reflects the level of skill in the art
than simply the level of sophistication of the technology.
Predictability of technology should be a relatively easy factor to apply
because the courts can look to analogous determinations within similar
contexts. For example, the predictability of a technology is one of the
factors that a trial court must take into account in determining if a patent
specification enables one of ordinary skill in the art to make and use the
full scope of the claimed invention without undue experimentation."'
Unpredictable technology narrows the claim scope permitted a patentee
because it is less likely that the invention will work in situations beyond
that for which the patentee provided actual examples in the
specification. 0' Similarly, unpredictable technology indicates a lower
skill in the art and makes a conclusion of nonobviousness more likely.
By qualitatively assessing the predictability of the field of an invention,
the decision-maker can better judge the size of the leap between prior art
and the invention that Phosita could have made at the time of the
invention. Thus, by providing a less ambiguous and more objective test

195. Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1206-07; Fiers, 984 F.2d at 1168-69.
196. 991 F.2d 781 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
197. 51 F.3d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
198. See id. at 1560; see also Bell, 991 F.2d at 784-85. The court qualified this holding by stating
that the amino acids of the protein sequence must be coded for by degenerate DNA codons. Deuel,
51 F.3d at 1560. For a basic explanation of the science involved in these decisions, see Anita Varma
& David Abraham, DNA Is Different: Legal Obviousness and the Balance Between Biotech
Inventors and the Market, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 53, 56-65 (1996).
199. Jeffrey S. Dillen, Comment, DNA Patentabilit--AnythingBut Obvious, 1997 WIS. L. REV.
1023, 1041-44 (1997).
200. In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731,737 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
201. See, e.g., Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362, 1373-75 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(holding that claims for antisense DNA technology in mammalian cells were invalid for lack of
enablement when the specification only provided examples in bacterial cells because of the
unpredictable nature of the technology).
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than sophistication of technology, predictability of technology more
adequately fulfills the purpose of the Phosita inquiry.
B.

Experience ofActive Workers in the FieldFocuses on ProblemSolving Ability Rather Than Credentials

The Federal Circuit should make the experience of active workers in
the field a factor in the Phosita inquiry. This factor should incorporate
the training the typical worker has received, the length of time spent in
the field, and any specialized knowledge or techniques that such a
worker normally possesses. If advances in the field are typically made by
interdisciplinary teams, then each of the necessary disciplines should be
represented. These components would ensure that all pertinent art is
considered in the nonobviousness assessment.
Knowledge of the type of training the typical worker has received
helps to define which technological fields are analogous art and therefore
which fields a Phosita is deemed to know. This is especially important in
areas of technology where inventions are made by interdisciplinary
teams. For example, while it may be nonobvious to a software engineer
to write a program that implements a Dutch auction on the internet, the
idea may be obvious to a team consisting of a software engineer and an
MBA. 2 Further, evidence of the typical worker's experience will help to
define the boundaries of prior art problems and solutions to which the
problem to be solved is related.0 3 Finally, the emphasis on experience
underscores the importance of assessing how the Phosita goes about
solving problems in her field rather than the credentials she possesses.
Therefore, by focusing on a more pertinent indicator of skill than mere
credentials, the suggested experience factor also furthers the purpose of
the Phosita determination.
C.

A Considerationof PriorArt Problems and Solutions Allows an
Assessment of the LogicalLeap PhositaMust Make Between the
PriorArt and an Invention

The Federal Circuit should emphasize and explain how to use the
factors relating to types of problems encountered in the art and the prior
202. See, e.g., William D. Wiese, Death of a Myth: The Patenting of Internet Business Models
After State Street Bank 4 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L REV. 17, 43-44 (2000) (arguing that
Priceline.com's reverse auction patent may be invalid for obviousness).
203. See infra Part W.C.
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art solutions to those problems. As Judge Learned Hand pointed out over
forty years ago, it would be nearly impossible to assess the ingenuity of
Phosita "except by recourse to the earlier work in the art, and to the
general history of all the means available at the time."' ' 4 Evidence on
these factors indicates whether Phosita would be likely to inductively
reason from the prior art to arrive at the inventor's solution. In other
words, a consideration of prior problems and solutions helps determine
the size of the logical gap Phosita must bridge to the inventionpotentially a quite different exercise than merely judging the differences
between the prior art and the invention.
The Federal Circuit has not employed the prior art problems/solutions
factor in a useful way. In its only discussion of the factors, the Federal
Circuit in In re GPAC argued that the level of skill in asbestos
containment systems was high because of the hazardous and difficult
nature of the work and because it is a highly regulated industry. 05 Thus,
the inference of high skill was not based on a discussion of the substance
of the problems and solutions, but on the court's characterization of the
safety aspects of the problems." 6
In Jacobson Brothers, Inc. v. United States,"7 the Court of Claims
followed a more useful analytical route. In determining the Phosita from
the prior art, it compared a previous problem in the art of underwater
salvage to that solved by the claimed invention.20 8 The court found that
each problem concerned the maneuvering of an underwater device in the
presence of underwater currents and tides.20 9 The court compared the
prior art solution to the patented solution and found them to employ
essentially identical systems of cables, pulleys, and winches.2 1 ° Because
the court determined not only that the differences between the prior art
device and the patented invention were small, but also that the problems
each solved were the same, it concluded that the inductive leap Phosita
would need to make between the prior
art and the invention was small.
21
1
obvious.
was
invention
the
Therefore,
204.
205.
206.
207.
(BNA)
208.
209.
210.
211.

Reiner v. I. Leon Co., 285 F.2d 501,503-04 (2d Cir. 1960).
In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
See supra Part II.B.4.
512 F.2d 1065, 1071 (Ct. Cl. 1975) (adopting opinion originally published in 184 U.S.P.Q.
181, 185 (Ct. Cl. 1974)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1071-72.
Id. at 1073.
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The focus of the prior art problems/solutions factor on assessing the
size of this inductive leap distinguishes it from the current
motivation/suggestion test of obviousness so heavily relied on by the
Federal Circuit. Although both the problems/solutions factor and the
motivation/suggestion test focus on the prior art, a motivation/suggestion
analysis of the facts of Jacobson shows how the two tests may yield
different results because of their different approaches. In the Jacobson
case, there was no explicit teaching or suggestion in the prior art
references themselves to combine the maneuvering system and the
underwater TV rig.2 '2 Hence, the patent at issue would likely have been
held valid using the motivation/suggestion test.2 3 These differing results
suggest that the prior art problems/solutions factor may be a more
stringent approach to nonobviousness than the motivation/suggestion
test. If, as some have suggested, the motivation/suggestion test sets a
lower standard for nonobviousness than required by Hotchkiss v.
Greenwood,2t4 and later Congress,"' the problems/solutions factor would
help raise the Phosita standard and therefore the nonobviousness
standard.
D.

Long-FeltNeed and Failureof Others To Make the Invention
Provide PrimaryEvidence of the Actual Level of Skill in the Art

Long-felt need and failure of others to make the invention should not
be utilized as "secondary" considerations, but rather as objective
evidence of actual skill in the art. Like the predictability factor, long-felt
need and failure of others bear directly on the question of skill level.216
When a problem is old in the art and has been the subject of more than de
minimus research, it suggests that no one of any skill level was able to
212. See id. at 1068-69 (finding that prior art underwater television systems did not utilize the
prior art maneuvering systems for diving bells).
213. The motivation/suggestion test could give the same result if motivation is found "in the
nature of the problem to be solved." However, although the Federal Circuit has often cited this
aspect of the test, it has seldom relied on it to find obviousness. See, eg., Pro-Mold & Tool Co. v.
Great Lakes Plastics, Inc., 75 F.3d 1568, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (finding that patent on storage
container for sports trading cards was invalid for obviousness because nature of subject matter-the
size of the cards-suggested the combination of a prior art card holder with a reference describing a
card holder no longer than necessary to enclose the card).
214. 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1851).
215. See, e-g., KENNETH J. BURCHFIEL, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 84-85

(1995).
216. One treatise viter has previously suggested that these factors are direct and primary
evidence of skill in the art. See 2 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTs 5-214 (2000).
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solve it.217 When combined with actual evidence that others failed to
solve the problem, one can infer that the solution has eluded those of
ordinary skill.21 8 As one commentator suggested, "failure of others to
make an invention proves directly that parallel research efforts were
under way at a number of firms, and that one firm (the patentee) won the
race to a common goal. 219
Many courts have long recognized the reliability of long-felt need and
failure of others factors as indicators of nonobviousness in general. Judge
Learned Hand repeatedly noted that, without factors such as these, courts
of laymen are likely to underrate or overrate "the difficulties involved in
making new and profitable discoveries in fields with which they cannot
be familiar ....
The advantage of these factors is that they relieve the
decision-maker of the difficult step of determining the logical gap
between the prior art and the invention. In addition, such evidence is
relatively easy to obtain, at least in the case of corporate research, where
most companies keep detailed records." Placing these factors inside the
Phosita determination should reduce some of the wavering of the Federal
Circuit on how much weight to accord secondary factors,' and may
encourage greater use of this type of evidence.
V.

CONCLUSION

Overall, the factors set forth in EnvironmentalDesigns for resolving
the level of ordinary skill in the art have not been terribly helpful to the
lower courts. The "rapidity of innovation" and "sophistication of
technology" factors are routinely ignored-probably because of their
enigmatic meaning for both the Phosita determination in particular and
nonobviousness in general. While most courts have discussed the scope
and content of the prior art and its differences from the invention at issue,
few have taken the approach of Jacobson and tried to assess the size of
the logical leap between the prior art and the invention. The inventor's
217. Merges, supra note 56, at 862-63.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 862.
220. See, eg., Reiner v. I. Leon Co., 285 F.2d 501, 503-04 (2d Cir. 1960) (Hand, J.); Safety Car
Heating & Lighting Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 155 F.2d 937,939 (2d Cir. 1946).
221. Merges, supranote 56, at 864.
222. Compare Stratoflex, Inc., v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (holding
that secondary considerations are "often ... the most probative and cogent evidence in the record")
with Newell Cos. v. Kenney Mfg. Cos., 864 F.2d 757, 768 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("Although [secondary]
factors must be considered, they do not control the obviousness conclusion.").
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educational level is legally infirm and apt to confuse courts into equating
the inventor's skill with that of a Phosita. Courts often make findings on
the educational level of active workers in the field but the use of this
information, other than acting as a rough proxy for high or low skill, has
been limited. Factors that more closely reflect the challenge of problems
faced by a Phosita and the way such a "person" thinks about problems
would provide valuable insight into the nonobviousness of an invention.
The suggested factors are put forward as one way to bring more
objectivity to an inherently subjective assessment. An approach that
systematically attempts to define the logical gap that existed at the time
of the invention between the prior art and the invention achieves this
goal. This gap is not the difference between the prior art and the
invention, which may be slight, but is the Phosita's understanding or lack
thereof which separates the invention from the prior art. These factors
should allow the ordinary level of skill in the art to be assessed in a more
meaningful fashion for the purpose of determining nonobviousness. They
should therefore permit a more accurate, and hopefully more predictable,
assessment of the nonobviousness of an invention while adhering to the
Graham analysis mandated by the United States Supreme Court.
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